



Extended Deterrence and Iran

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Introduction

Despite nearly seven decades of Nuclear weapons, (NWs) and four decades of Cold war in which they figured prominently, we still do not know very much about, or with any degree of assurance, what NWs can and cannot do beyond create widespread destruction. Questions about deterrence, extended deterrence and the political utility of NWs and whether these are general propositions/ laws or culturally or state specific, cannot be reliably answered.

In this paper I first discuss extended deterrence during the Cold war and after. I then turn to the case of Iran. The paper is thus doubly speculative, raising questions about how extended deterrence might apply in the case of Iran; discussing several features of the case and speculating about how Iran might react in a nuclear context. The questions are intended to stimulate further thinking about the specific and more general propositions. These can—and doubtless will—be fleshed out in the course of events.

My principal thesis is that the greatest danger from Iran stems from the risks of misjudgment rather than conscious risk-taking; that the extension by the United States of security guarantees to the GCC may be much easier than any nuclear guarantees; that in any event the GCC recipients (unlike Europeans /Japan) are ambivalent and reluctant about such guarantees. Nuclear guarantees may be less credible and less politically feasible for the U.S.. Whether they are necessary appears doubtful. Deterrence of Iranian conventional aggression against the GCC states by conventional defense, and of missiles by missile defense, should weaken any advantage Iran might gain from an "enhanced" nuclear shadow. Nuclear deterrence is to counter nuclear threats. As long as there is a sizeable U.S. presence in the Arabian peninsula, any such threats would inevitably involve the United States and its deterrent. The extension of a formal nuclear guarantee to the GCC states beyond this would appear excessive and certainly premature.

Extended Deterrence: The Cold War and Today

In retrospect the problem of deterrence and its extension during the Cold War, looks simple compared to the period following it. Two blocs clearly delimited, no territorial dispute as such, and relatively easy measurement of threat deterrence made devising a deterrent strategy less demanding. The extension of deterrence though was never easy. The U.S. guarantee of Europe had to deter the USSR, and reassure allies, which implied being credible without being alarming or provocative. The problem was that the European allies were never ready to counter the USSR's conventional superiority by their own efforts.[\[1\]](#)

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A non-nuclear defense of Europe being infeasible meant reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. But this became decreasingly credible if it required the United States to commit suicide in the event of an attack on Europe. While talk of raising or lowering the threshold of nuclear use alarmed allies, it became clear that the alliance need “flexible options.” Various options were considered over time: massive retaliation, limited war and even shared forces (MLF). The stationing of U.S. forces in Europe acting as a ‘tripwire’ was considered an indication of the reliability of the guarantee. Experience appears to endorse the wisdom of Dennis Healey’s theorem that “it takes more to reassure allies than to deter the adversary.”

The period since has become more complicated as threats have multiplied and diffused globally and the reassuring lines of blocs and armories have given way to nuclear aspirants and regional threats. States unable to fight modern wars can now do great damage at some distance from their own territory. Tomorrow’s nuclear powers may be deficient in most other components of power. And the acquisition of nuclear power may become banalized rather than a reflection of underlying power or a source of status.^[2]

Together with this the international system has moved from a bipolar to a unipolar and, some now argue, a non or a-polar system. Projecting the U.S. role and the international environment is difficult. The National Intelligence Council in analyzing the future U.S. role has noted two possibilities of concern to us: “the declining credibility of U.S. extended deterrence security guarantees, which could fuel new regional arms races ... and ... a diminished “interest and willingness to play a leadership role “ given its costs and possible domestic political pressures.^[3] This of course raises the more specific question: what happens to existing U.S. security guarantees^[4] and how would it affect willingness to assume new responsibilities? This is not idle speculation given the general unpopularity of the Arab states as rich, corrupt and alien in the U.S., and argument and pressures to reduce dependency on, and involvement with, them.^[5]

Ironically as interest in eliminating nuclear weapons has emerged in the West, interest elsewhere in acquiring them may have increased. The Obama administration, unlike its predecessor, is trying to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons, to set an example by reducing the inventory of weapons and accepting the CTBT and other measures to demonstrate its seriousness about non-proliferation. Aspiring nuclear powers are not necessarily influenced by U.S. nuclear policy. The U.S. conventional dominance is incentive enough. And as the gap between the U.S. technological capabilities here have increased, so has the urge for an unconventional “equalizer.”^[6]

This poses problems for the nuclear taboo and for U.S. security policy. The Bush administration argued that for some states “these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice.”^[7] The risks of use increase correspondingly. President Bush went further: “They seek weapons of mass destruction to keep the United States from helping allies and friends in the strategic parts of the world.”^[8] Nuclear proliferation thus threatens, or at least complicates U.S. security policy. Clearly the diffusion of nuclear weapons could complicate access, intervention

and the "free hand" the United States has had, not least in the Middle East.^[9] (This relates to the NIC projection earlier).

What does this say about deterrence and extended deterrence in a changed (multipolar?) world? So far U.S. non-proliferation policy vis a vis the difficult cases (North Korea and Iran) has been largely replaced by one of deterrence and containment. The United States needs to reassure old allies (notably Japan) while looking at new commitments. "The simplicity of relations when one party can concentrate its anxieties on a single other, and the ease of calculating forces and estimating the dangers they pose, may be lost."^[10] Neither the context nor the "lessons" of the Cold War confrontation may apply.

Nor is it clear what the lessons regarding either deterrence or extended deterrence are. First, the conditions.

The superpowers were not neighbors; had no territorial disputes; their armed conflicts were not with each other; and both were (it now appears), essentially status quo powers. Contrast this with for example India and Pakistan, where the conditions differ in every respect.^[11] Here Waltz's famous nuclear shadow which is supposed to inhibit conflict, has not done so. Rather, the existence of nuclear weapons enabled Pakistan to conduct a war of infiltration and support terrorist activities. There is also the question of the destabilizing effects of the process of proliferation, the gestation period over a number of years when other states are able to react, possibly militarily by strikes or by seeking an nuclear option as well.^[12] Arms races, surprise attacks may follow.

What of the lessons? If "deterrence presupposes that the threat of certain destruction of an enemy will induce prudence in that nation's policies" ^[13] it clearly has not worked on the subcontinent. In abstract deterrence is easy: requiring even "a low-probability of carrying out a highly destructive attack, ... the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on another country." In this view the putative aggressor cannot be sure that the object state will not respond and that is enough for deterrence. The uncertainty "about controlling escalation is at the heart of deterrence."^[14] Can one be sure, with Waltz, that since "deterrence does not depend on rationality" but fear and that "One need not become preoccupied with the characteristics of the state that is to be deterred or scrutinize its leaders ... in a nuclear world any state will be deterred by another state's second strike forces"?^[15]

While this view is tenable, it is hardly persuasive. States may or may not judge their interests "correctly" and hence the risks they will run will differ, whatever the stakes. Whereas the political conflicts between the United States and the USSR "were matters of life and death" those "between Israel and her Arab neighbors ... might appear to some of these governments as an issue for which anything must be risked." ^[16] In looking back it might be the case that the experience of the Cold War suggests that "deterrence extends to vital interests beyond the homeland more easily than most have thought." ^[17] If, indeed, extended deterrence was

relatively easy then, will it continue to be so in the new environment, where new nuclear states might seek to extend their deterrence?

The Case of Iran

Anticipating Iran's objectives is problematic as rhetoric is not tightly correlated with behavior. In all likelihood, the Iranians themselves do not know whether to build nuclear weapons or stop at the threshold. That type of long-term planning is simply not an Iranian characteristic, which is more inclined to improvise and adapt.^[18] Virtually any proposition about Iran can be contradicted, most are about 50 percent right. Iran is ideological and pragmatic, revolutionary and conservative, rigid and flexible.

Iran's broader goals are clear: the elimination of the U.S. presence/influence in the Middle East and its substitution by Iran's own hegemony and "model." Iranian behavior has been cautious and indirect, while slyly opportunistic. Domestic politics are important: as a source of policy—activist or restrained—and as a motivator. Foreign policy is used for legitimation of the regime. At present Iran feels vulnerable domestically and exposed internationally: does that make it more likely to be accommodating/prudent or more activist/confrontational?

Iran has developed no coherent theory or definition of deterrence. The term is used loosely to refer to an ability to retaliate or raise the costs, of an attack on Iran. Iran's experience conditions how it is conceived. At the dawn of the revolution Iranian strategists were much taken by the Maoist idea of "people's war." Unfortunately defense in depth and a war of attrition did not serve Iran's interests very well in the war with Iraq. Nor, for all the rhetoric since, did the "culture of martyrdom," in which morale and volunteer-martyrs were expected to defeat modern arms. Surprised and impressed by Iraq's use of missiles and chemical weapons, Iran scrambled to acquire surface to surface missiles, which since then have been built indigenously to substitute for aircraft, and to avoid dependence on foreign suppliers. Iran's interest in missiles as a terror weapon as it experienced in the "war of the cities" is analytically separate from its subsequent interest in WMD (c.f., Hitler's use of the V1 and V2), which it may come to serve.

Iran drew a number of lessons from the war with Iraq and later from the coalition war with Iraq in 1991:

- Insure against technological surprise (eg. missiles, CW, BW etc), cultivate options.
- Look for equalizers or short cut for deterrence;
- Rely on indigenous arms and
- Do not rely on other's inhibitions/restraint and do not count on the UNSC.

The 1991 war reinforced Iran's inclination for asymmetric war, which implies:

- Never confront the United States on a conventional battlefield;
- Emphasize the indirect approach, through militias, proxies and deniable allies;
- Use power to deny, or threaten U.S. assets mines, anti-ship missiles, submarines;

- Threaten and target U.S. regional allies as soft targets;
- Threaten unpleasant self-immolation e.g., "close the straits of Hormuz."

The lessons of post-2003 are still being digested but we can speculate on them:

- U.S. military power unmatched but not equaled by political judgment.
- U.S. regional presence/over-extension makes U.S. forces hostages and in extremis targets;
- Play on ambiguity of nuclear intentions to inhibit Gulf states.
- Play anti-Israeli card for 'Arab street' to inhibit Arab governments.

Iran has a number of cultural/ political characteristics' and lives in an environment in which proliferation will take place, which will condition the impact of that proliferation. We can enumerate these in summary form.

- Iran has a sense of grievance and entitlement that translates into an emphasis on its unspecified rights (haq), respect etc. with little discussion of 'responsibility.'
- Ideology and rhetoric risk making the regime a captive of its own making;
- Related to this is a national narcissism that makes it ignorant, insensitive or dismissive of others' concerns.[\[19\]](#)
- Insistence on Iran's leadership role and relevance of its 'Hezbollah model' together with a populist approach may lead to posturing for political purposes, and to impulses/constraints that entrap while provoking others.
- The emergence of the IRGC as a political force may make command and control of any nascent nuclear capability less subject to civilian authority. This element is more ideological and more adventurist professionally [\[20\]](#)
- Iran has weak conventional forces and might be tempted to rely on nuclear weapons as a substitute.

Iran's behavior will be influenced by the lessons it draws from its experience:

- How does Iran read the wars in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza(2008/9)? As victories for the "Hezbollah model"? Or as messages from Israel about how disproportionate its response can be?
- How does Iran interpret UNSC reaction to Korea? What does it learn from the U.S./Israel's insistence on something being "unacceptable," while accepting it?[\[21\]](#)
- Does this enhance U.S./Israel credibility in the nuclear sphere?
- Is the lesson of the past seven years: defiance pays?
- How likely is it that the regime in Iran once it becomes "nuclear capable" will spontaneously moderate?

The regional environment will also influence the impact of proliferation.

The Middle East is an area of multiple, overlapping axis of conflicts: Arab/Israel; Arab/Arab; Arab/Iran; and Israel/Iran. Distances are short and with the diffusion of missiles, warning times are limited. This 'tight coupling' makes for the possibility of surprise attacks with little time to evaluate threats before response.[\[22\]](#) More serious still is the ambiguity about missile warheads;

given this ambiguity, a state like Israel simply cannot afford to treat a missile coming from say Iran, as a conventional weapon.

This opacity “raise[s] the risk of an inadvertent nuclear response”^[23] finally there is the general opaqueness about programs and the unwillingness of states to enter into confidence building measures or strategic dialogues. This can lead to ignorance or miscalculation about other state’s “redlines.” One of the necessities in crises situations, (which abound in the Middle East) and especially in a future nuclearized environment, is the intensity of communication necessary between adversaries, whether through hotlines or other means.^[24] As we see today, contact in this region is considered a favor bestowed on the other side, not a necessity for strategic stability.

A Nuclear Capable Iran

What exactly is a "nuclear capable" Iran and how would it behave? From the dawn of the nuclear era it was recognized that states might want to reassure themselves, in an uncertain world, by developing a nuclear option.^[25] This kind of hedging is permitted under the NPT. The problem is that by stopping just short of the threshold it takes only a little impulse to go over it. Iran appears to have decided to go as near to the threshold as it can get, while remaining in the treaty. No one can be sure that it will not, once it has enough fissile material and confidence in its weaponization and delivery, simply break out of the treaty by denouncing it on some pretext or other. This is a distinct possibility. But it would entail certain costs and would be based on the premise that there are advantages to so doing or at least some strategic urgency. Furthermore it is not clear what the political benefits of a small and rudimentary capability may be. Could Iran translate that it into greater political influence in the region? Would it be more of a deterrent to an Israeli or U.S. attack on Iran?

If no one knows, it is possibly because the Iranians themselves have not decided definitively, for while the program is unlikely to be a "bargaining chip," nor is it one characterized by strategic urgency, a crash program like Saddam Hussein’s. This does not mean that Iranian leaders have not talked as if they want nuclear weapon, or at least ambiguously, while denying any such an intention.^[26]

Israel

In recent years regional politics have taken place against the backdrop of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s nuclear shadow was present in Israel’s wars in Lebanon and Gaza; where Israel sought forcibly to communicate the credibility of its deterrent. The GCC states have been acting under this shadow as well, inhibited, anxious and ambivalent.

In the event that Iran remains with a virtual capability, its influence and potential for exploiting the capability, will remain as it is, limited, creating a source of anxiety for the GCC and strategic concern for Israel but not fundamentally changing the strategic picture.

In the event that Iran leaves the NPT in favor of a declared capability, the implications for regional stability will be different. What kind of arsenal it chooses to build (minimal? second strike?) what kind of delivery systems; its declaratory doctrine; and its overall posture will be of interest especially to its neighbors.

Iran could use its small nuclear forces:

1. To deter major attacks on its homeland (deterrence by punishment rather than denial);
2. It could try or seek to lower the threshold of use to deter any attacks on it;
3. Try to empower clients to act while keeping the nuclear weapons to “aggressively sanctuarize” Iran from punishment/retaliation.[\[27\]](#) (i.e., as a cover for regional domination).

How likely/plausible is this? A nuclear capability once achieved will certainly limit the freedom of action of the United States and Israel, especially in contemplating direct attacks on Iran itself. This will include any conventional attacks on the country which could be seen as regime-threatening. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that Iran could contemplate extending deterrence to its proxies, who would be open to punishment. Iranian forces outside of Iran itself would be in a similar position. Iran would have every incentive not to confront the U.S./Israel directly, for fear of open-ended escalation.

As Waltz has observed “the problem of stretching a deterrent which was a Western alliance problem, does not apply to lesser nuclear states. Their problem is to protect themselves,” and because they are vulnerable to conventional attacks they rely on nuclear weapons. But these will be limited to use only if their survival is at stake.[\[28\]](#) In other words, “nuclear weapons deter adversaries from attacking one’s vital interests and not one’s minor interests.” Hence while deterrence of the homeland is relatively easy, seeking to deter attacks on minor or extended interests is problematic.[\[29\]](#)

One potential problem in the case of Iran, which may seek to use its investment in nuclear weapons (and compensate for its weak conventional weapons) by having NWs cover lower-level conventional contingencies, by lowering the nuclear threshold, is the need for its leaders to recognize the limited practical utility of NWs, which are not all-purpose weapons.

Iran and Israel have not clashed directly and have no major bilateral dispute other than the one Iran has chosen to pursue by positioning itself as the champion of the Palestinians and Muslims in general. This posturing has been expensive but relatively risk-free so far. As the risks go up, Iran is unlikely to exaggerate its own power and may shy away from further provocation. There are however, two risks.

First, that Iran may be carried away with its faith in its own cunning, and insensitive to Israeli concerns, step over that state’s red-lines. The other is one inherent in strategic competition, especially where there is mutual incomprehension and no contact between adversaries. As Tom Schelling has suggested crisis-management rests on the ‘manipulation of shared risk’. But where

the strategic appreciation of the risk is quite different on the two sides, “an element of radical uncertainty would be introduced into the process.”^[30]

The GCC

Iran's nuclear ambitions stem from its search for status and an important regional role. Antagonism toward, and fear of, the United States is an additional motive. Clearly an important part of this rivalry is centered on the Persian Gulf, where Iran wants to become the leading power and to replace the existing order by one in which Tehran calls the shots. Iran has some advantages and some weaknesses in this quest. The advantages stem from U.S. mistakes and doubts about U.S. judgment and staying power. Iran's “model” may also appeal to some in the region, especially the ‘dispossessed’ in Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, and to those Arabs who believe that militant Islam stands a better chance than its secular competitors of dislodging Israel from Palestine. Iran, of course, has played to this “Arab street.” Iran's liabilities are equally impressive. It is a Persian and Shi'i state generally distrusted by the Arab Sunnis. Moreover its size (whatever its regime) makes Iran a potential threat to the smaller, weaker Gulf states. Some of the GCC believe that Iran is territorially revisionist (UAE, Bahrain) and many see its revolutionary, republican, regime as a threat to monarchs/sheikhs.

Iran is by far the most important state in the Gulf, demographically and physically, dominating its neighbors intentionally or not. In recent years the shadow of its nuclear ambitions has increased an existing inclination to defer Iran and to avoid antagonizing it. It is difficult to see how an ambiguous or overt Iranian nuclear capability would serve Iran's objectives in the Persian Gulf. Would Iran expect the GCC states to end their defense relations with the U.S./West? Would Iran seek to neutralize the Gulf?

Does Iran expect a level of post nuclear deference that would make it the security manager of the region?

The GCC states by common account wish to avoid a military strike against Iran; prevent a nuclear Iran; and forestall a possible grand bargain between Washington and Tehran. Some of the GCC lean toward accommodating Iran (“bandwaggoning”); others, to balancing it by closer ties with the U.S.; and many adopt both postures. No GCC state is in a position to seek an independent (i.e., national) balancing capability, at least in a meaningful time-frame. While leaning toward Israel for strategic reassurance, few states are able to formalize ties (Oman and Qatar being possible exceptions).

No state in the region wishes to exchange U.S. for Iranian hegemony. The structure of Gulf politics, now upended by Iraq's travails, will return to a triangular model, which suits the smaller GCC states the best. Iran is constrained from making excessive or overt demands on its neighbors by the possibility that it may drive them together. Tehran has sought to extend its influence in the region through governments, leaving the threat of subversion/terrorism in the background. The acquisition of a more overt nuclear capability might be used to intimidate

governments, implied or indirect. But it would run the risk mentioned, of uniting the GCC and reinforcing their ties with the U.S.

There is also the question of U.S. response.

The United States and Extended Deterrence in the Gulf and Beyond

Since the end of the Cold war, the United States has had no peer group adversary. It has not needed to use nuclear deterrence against a conventional threat. Whether in East Asia or the Middle East, the United States is able to balance any conventional threat by conventional forces, leaving its nuclear deterrent for nuclear threats. What does it mean to “deter Iran?”

In the case of Israel the situation is clear. Iranian nuclear threats would be more than countered by Israel’s own nuclear arsenal. A U.S. nuclear guarantee might be useful as a means of reinforcing this deterrent, ensuring that there is no doubt in Tehran about the support Israel enjoys. It would be useful but not essential. (In the future, if arms control comes to the Middle East, a U.S. guarantee might be a precondition to the denuclearization of the region)

In the Gulf in theory Iran could pose three types of threat: [\[31\]](#)

- outright aggression by conventional forces;
- indirect aggression, subversion, and
- coercive nuclear threats.

The U.S. military presence in the region, the need to cross the Gulf’s waters and the relatively weak state of Iranian conventional forces (especially airpower and air defense) suggest that this threat could be countered on its own terms.

The threat from subversion would not be appreciably changed by Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons. Nor would it need to be countered by them.

Translating nuclear weapons’ possession into meaningful political influence has proven difficult so far in the nuclear age. Nuclear threats if unimplemented devalue them and if implemented risk devastation. Against such threats a nuclear guarantee, express or implied, might be necessary or at least useful.

What is Current U.S. Policy?

The United States is encouraging the GCC states to cooperate militarily with each other and with the United States. This implies a continuation of a high level of arms sales to the area. The United States is considering the extension of a “ defense umbrella” to the region, in order to contain Iran and to offset any influence Tehran may gain from its nuclear program. [\[32\]](#) Formal discussion of the extension of a nuclear umbrella has not (yet) begun. In fact this may be

problematic in terms of at least U.S. domestic politics, and possibly that of the GCC states, as well. Moreover it is not clear that it is necessary.

As long as U.S. forces remain in the area, there is an implicit guarantee or deterrent. The third component of the U.S. defense relationship is assistance in the creation of an anti-missile defense system, which would reliably degrade any missile threat that Iran might pose to the region, thus neutralizing or at least diluting any advantage that Iran might gain. These three areas, improved regional defense cooperation, intensified defense ties with the United States and an anti-missile system, should go some way to reassuring the U.S. Gulf allies, in effect extending a security umbrella though not (yet?) a nuclear one.^[33]

Whether the United States needs to extend nuclear deterrence to the region in a formal manner, is unclear to this author. Such a commitment might be politically difficult. It might reassure the GCC states to resist possible Iranian nuclear coercion. But such coercion is less likely (and more risky) than subtle intimidation, the utilization of the nuclear shadow(if you will), which in turn can be just as easily resisted by presenting as strong political front and conventional defense.

References

1. In part this raised the problem of German rearmament. Franz-Josef Strauss noted that NATO members wanted a German force “strong enough to deter Russia but not scare the Belgians” quoted in Robert Beissner, *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War* (London: Oxford UP, 2006) 368.
2. “Something is no longer a symbol of opulence or greatness if it is possessed by those who are by common consent, neither opulent nor great.” Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (London: Chatto and Windus for ISS, 1962), 198.
3. *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Wash DC: NIC, 2008) 93, 97.
4. These guarantees have been a cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation though as Beaton and Maddox acidly observed: “some might, of course, think the remedy worse than the disease.” 199.
5. See e.g., Michael Klare “Tithing at the Altar” *The National Interest*, No. 102 (August 2009): 20-29.
6. See Sidney Drell & James Goodby, *The Gravest Danger: Nuclear Weapons* (Stanford: Hoover, 2003), 30-31; and Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (London: Norton, 2003), 150-151.
7. *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, DC, December 2003)

8. Excerpts from speech *The New York Times* May 2, 2001, A10 quoted in Waltz and Sagan, 144.
9. See Waltz and Sagan, 144, 148-9. Waltz talks of “cramping the U.S. style”.
10. Waltz and Sagan, 14-15.
11. See Drell and Goodby, 22, 25.
12. Sagan in Waltz and Sagan, 202-203.
13. Drell and Goodby, 26.
14. Waltz in Waltz and Sagan 21-22, 143.
15. Waltz in Waltz and Sagan, 154, 50, Note, “Whatever the identity of rulers and the characteristics of their states, the national behaviors they produce are strongly conditioned by the world outside,” 132. See also Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Realities,” 739. (Note that Waltz believes the acquisition of a second strike capability is relatively easy for new nuclear powers), 30-31.
16. Beaton and Maddox, 202.
17. Waltz in Waltz and Sagan, 25-26.
18. Ferdowsi, the National poet of the 10/11th century in his *Shahnameh* (Book of Kings), observed: “Che farda shaved, fekr’e farda konim” [“When(if) tomorrow comes, lets think about tomorrow.”]
19. Missiles marked “death to Israel” are taken seriously in Israel. But Iranians rarely mean what they say: “death to ... is rarely meant.” See Hooman Majd, *The Ayatollah Begs to Differ* (London: Penguin, 2009), 228
20. E.g., the Qods Brigade. For a more extended discussion of some of these see this author’s *Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2006).
21. David Sanger, *The Inheritance* (NY:Crown, 2009) 328 (c.f., Graham Allison).
22. For a brief discussion see Sagan in Waltz and Sagan, 79.
23. See Bruce Sugden, “Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of conventional Ballistic Missiles,” *International Security* 34, No. 1 (Summer 2009): 113-146, especially 143.

24. See Coral Bell's work on the "conventions of crisis." "Crisis Diplomacy", Ch.6 in Laurence Martin (ed) *Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age* (London: Heineman, 1979), 157-185.

25. See Beaton and Maddox, 185, 189.

26. Ayatollah at that time President Khamene'i is quoted as saying: "A nuclear arsenal would serve as a deterrent in the hands of God's soldiers." Joby Warrick, "Iran's envoy sees Upcoming Talks as an Opening," *Washington Post*, September 18, 2009.

27. The phrase is Jean Louis Gergorin's.

28. Waltz in Waltz and Sagan, 27.

29. See Waltz in Waltz and Sagan, 17, 32-33. (Note this is why Israel's deterrent cannot cover the occupied territories). See also Beaton and Maddox who observe that Israel's nuclear weapons and not a deterrent for minor, or secondary attacks and are more credible "in the event the country was in danger of destruction," 178.

30. See Coral Bell in *Strategic Thought*, 185. See also this author's monograph on *Iranian Risktaking in Perspective* (Paris: IFRI, 2008).

31. I discount Iran's use of NWs against U.S. forces in the peninsula.

32. Admiral Mullen mentioned this in July 2009 his "Security and Stability in the Broader Middle East: A Cooperative Approach" speech at the CSIS, Washington, DC, July 7, 2009 (<http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID+1217>.) See also "Gates, urges Arabs to strengthen military ties with eye to Iran," (*AFP*, September 8, 2009); and Hillary Clinton, Julian Borger, "U.S. ready to upgrade defenses of Gulf allies if Iran builds nuclear arms," *The Guardian*, July 22, 2009.

33. I have not discussed Turkey which as a member of NATO is, in effect, already covered by a security guarantee. Turkey looks likely to buy the Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile for its own defense.